

the text's portrait of Ulpian- *Keitoukeitos* in the epitomised 1.1e; or his translation of the terms for shellfish (3.85c ff.), against Gulick.

O.'s previous work has amply demonstrated his sophistication as a textual critic and philologist, and there is more than one point in his translation where these qualities shine: for example, the case of the puzzling term *ὄρος*, which appears at the beginning of a eulogy of Rome as the epitome of the world in the epitomised first book (1.20b). Gulick took it to mark the existence of a section in the original text on boundaries. Hence his grammatically inaccurate and italicised rendering of the term as 'boundaries' (vol. 1, p. 87). O. (vol. 1, p. 111) translates it as 'a division', and (ibid. n. 166) with convincing ingenuity interprets it as a reference to the end of a half-book in the text's original version, which the epitome neatly preserved (see also his introduction, p. xiv). This is not a minor point: insights of this sort contribute to our appreciation of how histories of textual transmission are often inscribed within ancient texts. Equally important, they draw attention to the mechanism of epitomising, a scholarly operation that, though little studied by contemporary Classicists, was fundamental to the transmission of ancient knowledge.

O. has made a number of significant stylistic and editorial choices in order to make his text as reader-friendly as possible. He marks the beginnings of Casaubon's alphabetical sections with vertical lines in the text, and flags Athenaeus' embedded quotations through visual gaps and quotation marks in both the Greek and English. This harmonises the two versions, especially where poetic quotations are concerned, and makes the English text (both on its own and against the Greek) a much smoother read than before. The improvement is particularly clear in sections laden with quotation, such as Book 4 (vol. 2, pp. 111–369; cf. Gulick's disregard for verse sequence in his English text). One of its most notable effects is that it allows the reader to discern the different textual and rhetorical layers that the *Deipnosophistae* embeds. O. also provides a good balance of explanatory footnotes, which clarify obscure aspects of meaning or provide supplementary background information.

Last but not least, O. has fully updated the annotation of Athenaeus' embedded texts and poetic fragments. He prompts the reader to consult recently published authoritative editions and commentaries, such as Kassel–Austin instead of Kock, Snell instead of Nauck, and Giannantoni for Socratic texts. This is a major help, both for the first-time reader and for scholars.

Each volume is followed by an index of proper names. Both indexes are fairly comprehensive, but for reasons that are not clear seem to omit place-names, such as Alexandria or Rome. A general thematic index, perhaps in a forthcoming volume, would be most welcome.

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## ATHENAEUS AND THE HISTORIANS

LENFANT (D.) (ed.) *Athénée et les fragments d'historiens. Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (16–18 juin 2005)*. Pp. 474, ill. Paris: De Boccard, 2007. Paper, €43. ISBN: 978-2-7018-0230-5.

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Athenaeus is enjoying a bumper decade. *L'Année philologique* records only 234 titles between 1951 and 1999; in 2000 the Braund–Wilkins collection *Athenaeus and his*

*World* (Exeter University Press) alone added 41 new papers. Since then the flood has continued. *L'Année* lists 109 more contributions in 2000–06, among which those of Christian Jacob deserve a special mention. Long Athenaeus papers appeared in both the 2007 and the 2008 *Journal of Hellenic Studies*; Olson's new Loeb is making quick progress; a second Exeter collection is also promised, *Athenaeus and his Philosophers at Supper* (ed. Wilkins). The volume under review focusses on Athenaeus' citations of historians, and is very important.

First come two scene-setting papers by the Athenaeus giants G. Zecchini and J. Wilkins. Then comes analysis of Athenaeus' treatment of extant texts, carefully comparing his quotations and summaries with the original: this is carried through in exemplary fashion by the Editor D. Lenfant for Herodotus and by C. Maisonneuve for Xenophon. (A similar treatment of Polybius would be expected, but Walbank's paper in the 2000 volume is extensively quoted in this collection.) Then follow discussions of Athenaeus' treatment of lost writers: Hellanicus (D. Ambaglio), Ephorus (G. Parmeggiani), Theopompus (A. Chávez Reino and G. Ottone), the Aristotelian *Constitutions* (J. Bollansée), Chares of Mytilene (P. Payen), Duris of Samos (P. Giovanelli-Jouanna), Phylarchus (G. Schepens), Philochorus (V. Costa), Sosibius of Sparta (E. Lévy), and Posidonius (K. Clarke). The collection is rounded off by comparisons with Athenaeus' technique with non-historians: two pieces on Homer (D. Bouvier, C. Bréchet), and one each on Plato (L. Romeri) and medical writers (C. Magdelaine). After the final paper there are still nearly 100 pages to go, with useful annexes on Athenaeus' text, a summary of his argument and a guide to Jacoby's *FGrH*; then a series of excellent indexes which make up for a paucity of cross-references within the papers themselves. It is an impressive cast-list, and it does not disappoint. Besides Lenfant and Maisonneuve, I found the papers of Schepens, Clarke and Bouvier the most thought-provoking, but the general standard is high.

I used my own paper in the 2000 Braund–Wilkins collection to argue that Athenaeus' adaptations were more extensive, more thoughtful and sometimes more insidious than had generally been acknowledged. Lenfant in particular paints a picture that is more reassuring to those wishing to use Athenaeus as a quarry for lost authors, and I should probably plead guilty to her charge (p. 45) of picking the examples that best suited my case. (I am however unconvinced by her counter, p. 57, to my suggestion that at 631d Athenaeus misleadingly adapts Herodotus' story of Psammetichus' cup to make his own point: several instances treated elsewhere in this book might give some support for that view, e.g. pp. 92–4, 149–51, 227–8, 330–1.) Maisonneuve's Athenaeus also 'plays fair' (p. 80) with the original Xenophon, at least most of the time. Both chapters certainly provide case studies that are useful eye-openers as we turn to the fragmentary texts.

As it happens, few of those chapters make use of those eye-openers: some mention the value of comparing the adaptation of extant texts, but all start from and concentrate on Athenaeus' treatment of their own authors. That is no bad thing, for a startling consensus appears, the more impressive as there seems to have been little communication among the scholars before writing (it is striking, for instance, how many independent treatments there are of the differing introductory phrases which distinguish citation from paraphrase). Chapter after chapter begins by pointing out how large a proportion of a historian's fragments are owed to Athenaeus, then emphasises how easy it would be to get a false picture of a historian's interests from Athenaeus' selection. Athenaeus 'recentres' (Magdelaine's phrase) his material to suit his own preoccupations, and can show scant interest in, say, Polybius' politico-military themes, or in non-culinary ethnographic aspects of societies, or in

medical perspectives beyond the dietetic. Several contributors are readier than earlier scholars to allow Athenaeus first-hand knowledge of the original texts, though many also emphasise how difficult it is to be certain. Both these tendencies seem to me well founded, though it would have been good to have more renuancing of the first-hand/second-hand distinction: might not Athenaeus have known some texts both at first hand (from some time back) and via an intermediary (during the compositional process)? And might he not have used slave or freedman assistants to scour some of the outlying literature? (Seneca was said to have been let down from time to time by those 'whom he had charged with questions to investigate', Quint. 10.1.128.) Maisonneuve plays with similar ideas (p. 101), and Clarke reflects thoughtfully on Athenaeus' possibly varied use of notes and/or memory (pp. 299–300); perhaps there could have been more along these lines.

Still, such a consensus is indeed striking, especially as it harmonises so well with those initial findings of Lenfant and Maisonneuve. The one contribution that strikes a different note is that of Lévy on Sosibius, but even that is a valuable illustration that the volume is not pushing on an open door: a very distinguished scholar can still reach conclusions which most of the other contributors must have found dubious. Lévy infers, for instance, a particular interest of Sosibius in ritual because several of the Athenaeus fragments deal with festivals, garlands, and ceremonial cakes. He also concludes that Sosibius was not interested in political or constitutional matters because none of this surfaces in Athenaeus, and he uses this as a pointer to Sosibius' date. None of this is secure: Athenaeus' thematic 'recentering' can explain everything.

Athenaeus certainly emerges as a much more interesting writer than he seemed twenty years ago, even though this book's admirably sharp focus means that many individual features only emerge in passing. There are several themes here worth pursuing for their own sake. Evidently no banquet and no discussion could have been really like this, but what exactly is the mix of idealism, fantasy, and real life? Bréchet argues interestingly that the Homeric citations reveal an underlying cultural macrotext, whereby participants are deeply familiar not merely with the Homeric texts themselves but with the entire exegetic tradition, and this explains a knowing allusiveness in many of the citations. If so, does it reflect a *genuine* familiarity in Athenaeus' readers as well, or simply something they might accept either as a playful fantasy or as an unrealisable ideal? And, whatever may be the case with the Homeric citations, is it safe to extend this to other writers too? Might there also be a sense in which Athenaeus was 'constructing' a writer in his own text rather than relying on pre-existing audience familiarity? That might be a matter of rebuilding an author after his own image, more or less playfully (thus Clarke on Posidonius, pp. 293, 301–2, and Bouvier on Homer, pp. 313, 319), or it might create one who could serve as a contrasting foil: thus with the travestied version of Plato's symposia that contrasts with Homer's (Wilkins, Bouvier, Romeri), and perhaps also with the oh-so-decadent Arcestratus of Gela, treated insightfully by Wilkins in *JHS* 2008. Then there are a few suggestions that different banqueters may have different favourite authors and quote them in different ways (pp. 86, 95–100, 141, 152 [sceptical], 245–8, 297, 300, 306, 310–3, 352–3, 360–1): such characterisation would evidently repay more analysis. And then there is Rome. Is Athenaeus really so pro-Roman as Zecchini thinks (p. 28)? Or is there a hint that Rome may itself be threatened by such luxury (Wilkins)? How exactly, anyway, are we to take the anti-luxury moralism of one who gives fifteen books to the delights of the cookbook and the table?

So the scholarly feasting on Athenaeus is far from over yet. But the main courses will have to be good if they are to live up to the standards set by this starter.

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## PLOTINUS

LAVAUD (L.) *D'une Métaphysique à l'autre. Figures de l'altérité dans la philosophie de Plotin*. Pp. iv + 311. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2008. Paper, €35. ISBN: 978-2-7116-1968-9.

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Although the transcendent One has long been recognised as one of the defining characteristics of Plotinus' metaphysics (and, to a lesser extent, its counterpart, matter, at the other end of the universe), our general concept of the Neoplatonic universe has been of a continuum stretching from the One through Intellect and Soul to the physical universe and finally matter. This study prompts us to view that structure in a different way by exploring the similarities between the One and matter, each being, though in different ways, beyond and 'other' than Being, which forms the central core of the system, a core that is explored and expressed with the concepts and tools of traditional epistemology. It is in opening up to exploration these two realms of 'otherness' which lie outside the traditional metaphysics of Being that Plotinus demonstrates an innovation in ideas and expression that pushes to the limits, and sometimes beyond, the philosophical methodology used to discourse upon his inherited concept of intellect as the world of Being. This perspective allows the author to adjust the hierarchical emphasis of the system and to observe some instructive parallels in the way Plotinus struggles to explore and express the 'other'. 'Otherness' and 'identity' are twin concepts which run through the Plotinian universe, though as L. so clearly establishes, with often diverse functions and meanings. Apart from the 'otherness' at each end of the system, there is a differently operating 'otherness' which holds together the intelligible world in which both difference and identity are key factors.

The book is divided into four parts. Three are obvious: Matter, the World of Being, the One. Inserted is a fourth: the sensible world, which represents a sort of marginal area between that of matter, as the completely other, and real Being.

L.'s analysis of Plotinus' doctrine of matter introduces new insights into the way in which Plotinus combines and changes Aristotelian and Platonic concepts with particular emphasis on the application of *sterêsis* not as predicated of matter as in Aristotle but as identical with it. The language of predication is in fact superseded as is that of substance, for matter is no longer for Plotinus a receptacle of form in the Aristotelian sense (just as, at the other end of the scale, the One is an 'activity' which is not an *ousia*). Yet for Plotinus matter still 'remains' when all else is stripped away. It is not absolutely nothing, but rather not-being in the sense of 'less than being', a relational not-being. Although the otherness of matter is described by Plotinus in terms of Aristotelian *sterêsis* and Platonic antithesis, it does not fully accord with either (*sterêsis* is not in a substrate, antithesis is not between Forms on the same ontological level, but between levels – matter and enformed matter). But how do we